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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











FALON HAILE, Individual Capacity; ROBIN SCHWARTZ, Individual Capacity; 
RICARDO JACKSON, Individual Capacity; WILLIAM STEWART, Individual 
Capacity; SALVATORE ADAMO, Individual Capacity; MICHAEL WENEROWICZ, 
Individual Capacity; TOM ROWLANDS, Individual Capacity;  
GERALD GALINSKI, Individual Capacity; ROBERT DURISON, Individual Capacity; 




On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-12-cv-01961) 
District Judge:  Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 18, 2014 
 
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ AND NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 









 Mario Gause appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his civil 
rights complaint.  We will affirm.  
I. 
 In 1993, the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas convicted Mario Gause 
of rape and related charges.  He eventually received a sentence of 9 to 18 years’ 
imprisonment and was released from incarceration in February 2012. 
 In April 2013, Gause filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various civil rights violations in 
relation to his trial, conviction, and confinement.  In the complaint, Gause claimed that: 
(1) Judge Ricardo Jackson, of the Court of Common Pleas, was biased against him; (2) 
William Stewart and Salvatore Adamo, his trial and appellate attorneys, respectively, 
were ineffective; (3) Robin Schwartz, of the Philadelphia District Attorney’s office, 
knowingly relied on false testimony; (4) Falon Haile, the victim, provided false testimony 
and defamed him; and (5) Michael Wenerowicz, Tom Rowlands, Gerald Galinski, Bob 
Durison, and Christopher Thomas, employees of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections, detained him in prison beyond his term of incarceration.  He alleged that he 
has consequently suffered cruel and unusual punishment and continuous injury in 
violation of the 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendments.   
 The District Judge reviewed Gause’s complaint under the screening provisions of 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  He determined that Schwartz and Jackson were immune from 
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suit under § 1983, and that Haile, Stewart, and Adamo were not proper defendants in a 
§ 1983 action because they were not state actors.  The District Judge also determined that 
Haile was absolutely immune from any tort claims arising from her testimony, and that 
the statute of limitations had run on Gause’s defamation and malicious prosecution 
claims against her.  Accordingly, the District Judge dismissed, sua sponte, the claims 
against those five defendants.  The remaining five defendants then moved to dismiss 
Gause’s complaint under the favorable termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 
477 (1994).  After concluding that Heck precluded Gause from seeking damages related 
to his conviction and confinement, the District Judge dismissed the complaint.  Gause 
timely appealed. 
II. 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s dismissal of Gause’s complaint.  See Tourscher v. 
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  A federal court may properly dismiss an 
action sua sponte under the screening provisions of § 1915(e)(2)(B) if “the action is 
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks 
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”  Ball v. Famiglio, 726 
F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).  To survive a motion to 
dismiss, a plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The complaint must contain “factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s are] 
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liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).  In conducting our review, we liberally construe Gause’s pro 
se filings.  See Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011). 
III. 
The District Court dismissed, sua sponte, Gause’s claims against Haile, Schwartz, 
Jackson, Stewart, and Adamo.  As the District Court correctly determined, Jackson, 
Schwartz, and Haile are immune from suit for their roles as judge, prosecutor, and 
witness, respectively.  “A judicial officer in the performance of his duties has absolute 
immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.”  Azubuko v. Royal, 443 
F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006).  Similarly, a prosecutor is immune from damages in a 
§ 1983 action for her initiation of a prosecution and presentation of a state’s case.  Imbler 
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).  Witnesses, too, are immune from § 1983 
damages “based upon their testimony.”  Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 125 (3d Cir. 
2001).  Nowhere in the complaint or accompanying motion did Gause allege any actions 
by Jackson outside of his role as a trial judge.  Gause’s claims against Schwartz revolve 
around her role in prosecuting him on behalf of the Commonwealth.  His claims against 
Haile all stem from her testimony against him.  Accordingly, the District Court properly 
concluded that Jackson, Schwartz, and Haile are immune from Gause’s suit.1  See id.   
Nor did Gause’s complaint state a claim against Public Defenders Stewart and 
Adamo, for they were not state actors for purposes of § 1983.  See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 
                                              
1
 To the extent that Gause sought to sue Haile for malicious prosecution, he cannot sustain his burden of showing 
that the criminal proceeding ended in his favor.  See McKenna v. City of Phila., 582 F.3d 447, 461 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law 
when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding.”). 
The District Court also properly granted the remaining defendants’ motion to 
dismiss.  Gause claimed that Wenerowicz, Rowlands, Galinski, Durison, and Thomas 
failed to credit Gause with the time he was incarcerated between his vacated, initial 
sentence, and his re-imposed sentence, thus resulting in an unlawfully long period of 
detention.  However, a ruling that Gause was held in excess of the maximum sentence 
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his “confinement or its duration,” and would 
therefore violate Heck.  See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004) (stating that 
Heck bars § 1983 claims that implicitly question the validity of a conviction or the 
duration of a sentence).  Further, despite his repeated attempts to collaterally challenge 
his conviction and sentence in both state and federal courts, his sentence has never been 
overturned, expunged, or declared invalid.  See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; see also 
Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177-78 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting a plaintiff’s 
argument that because habeas relief was no longer available to him, he should be able to 
maintain a § 1983 action for false imprisonment).  Gause is therefore barred from 
pursuing this claim in a § 1983 action.  See id.  
 
 
